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Abstract
Principal-agency problems due to hidden incentives might be amplified, for example, under 
circumstances when unjustified trust in an inspector is associated with higher perception of 
building quality. This paper sets out to determine whether a significant difference exists in the 
owner’s perception of the building quality based on the perception of the inspector and the 
inspection process within multi-dwelling housing. A principal-agent theoretical perspective 
and the question of trust is applied on data from a survey sent to 1563 housing cooperatives 
in Sweden and analysed using a one-sided ANOVA as well as Kruskal-Wallis and post-hoc 
Dunn’s test. The major finding is that differences in perception associated with the company 
size of the developer, the timing of the inspection as well as the complexity of the process for 
the owners affects reported defect. The main implication is that efforts to address shortcomings 
related to the gap between the developer and the owner, in the context of building quality 
and perceived severity of defects, need to be customised to different owner groups. A better 
understanding of the inspection process by the owner improves active participation, which 
leads to efficient quality improvement. Society benefits from improved comprehension and 
utilisation of the results.
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Introduction
The number of new multi-dwelling housing constructions labelled as energy efficient or low-
energy by the developer is steadily rising in Sweden but studies show that in a number of cases 
the predicted energy performance of residential buildings before occupancy differs widely 
from the recorded energy performance (McElroy and Rosenow, 2019; De Wilde, 2014; Bagge 
and Johansson, 2013). The discrepancy may occur due to deviations from the stated design, 
expected occupant behaviour or building quality (Bordass, et al., 2001; Alencastro, Fuertes, 
and de Wilde, 2018; Dasgupta, Prodromou, and Mumovic, 2012). Building control and 
building inspections serve as a means of ensuring that basic standard requirements as dictated 
by statutes and building energy performance resolutions (see e.g. European Parliament, 2003; 
Murtagh, Achkar, and Roberts, 2018) and/or owner requirements are fulfilled. 
Pre- and post-occupancy building inspection is characteristic of a principal-agent 
relationship which occurs when a person or entity delegates some decision-making authority 
to the agent, in this case the inspector ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Any further decisions 
by the delegator (the principal) will depend on information supplied by the agent directly or 
indirectly.  Markets with heterogeneous products such as in the building construction and 
housing brokerage sectors present situations in which, at a given time, the agent might have 
specific information which is relevant to the decision to be taken but which is unknown to 
the principal. An example of this information asymmetry is knowledge about the status of 
the building in the form of defects whereby the principal has to rely on the willingness of the 
agent to share the information. Thus, the principal’s satisfaction with building quality relies 
on the inspector (the agent) to be trustworthy. As noted in Goeschl and Jarke (2017, p.320), 
“being trustworthy is not taking advantage of others when trusted while to trust is to rely 
on others not to take advantage of you”. Trust reflects confidence in an exchange partner’s 
reliability and integrity, which is associated with qualities such as being consistent, competent, 
honest, fair, responsible, helpful and benevolent (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).
Previous research has discussed inspection from a technical or legal perspective and has 
predominantly been based on inspection audits as the source of data on the occurrence and 
type of defects ( Johnsson and Meiling, 2009; Forcada, et al., 2016). Studies on building defects 
have mainly focused on the occurrence of defects (Forcada, et al., 2016; Sommerville, 2007; 
Atkinson, 1999), the relationship between defects and customer satisfaction (Auchterlounie, 
2009; Milion, Alves and Paliari, 2017; Fauzi and Abidin, 2012), diagnosis of defects (Kangwa 
and Olubodun, 2006; Sui Pheng and Wee, 2001), or the cost and remediation of defects 
(Hopkin, et al., 2017). Though the human factor and effect on building quality has been 
recognised by Sunding and Ekholm (2014) and Forsythe (2015), the correlation between 
the inspection process, the inspector and the owner has not fully been examined from the 
perspective of the owner’s knowledge base and pathways to trust especially within multi-
dwelling housing. 
Owner-occupiers in the single-family home market are often the commissioners and close 
monitors of their housing construction. The building inspector is an agent of the owner-
occupier. On the other hand, construction within the multi-family housing sector is often 
commissioned by a developer who also contracts the building inspector (the agent). However, 
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the guarantee inspection is carried out in the presence of the dweller (condominium owner 
or tenant) whose perceptions and eventual satisfaction with the inspector and the inspection 
process provide valuable information about the perceived quality of the building. This aspect is 
of interest in markets such as Sweden in which approximately one quarter of the total housing 
falls under the multi-dwelling tenant-owner tenure, “bostadsrätt”. It is a form of limited equity 
cooperative whose legal structure in Sweden has been described as paradoxical (Ruonavaara, 
2005) as well as unique and confusing (Scanlon and Whitehead, 2004). Decision-making 
for the housing cooperative is in the hands of a committee that might not have experience in 
property management (Bergsten and Holmqvist, 2013). 
The purpose of this paper which is based on the application of a principal-agent theoretical 
perspective and the question of trust is to contribute to the discussion on the gap between 
the developer and the owner in the context of building quality and perceived severity of 
defects within the multi-dwelling housing cooperative sector. The paper presents a study on 
the correlation between the quality index presented in the paper and the actions as well as 
perceptions of the actors involved in the inspection process.
The inspection process and perceived quality of the building are examined through the 
following sub-research questions:
RQ1. How does owners’ perception of the inspector as trustworthy affect the perceived 
quality of the building under various characteristics within multi-housing sector in 
Sweden?
RQ2. How does owners’ understanding of/trust in the inspection process affect the 
perceived quality of the building under various characteristics within multi-housing 
sector in Sweden?
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: the next section contains a brief 
literature review on the concept of quality in relation to defects and customer satisfaction. 
This is followed by a section on the principal-agent perspective and the principal-agent 
relationships during housing building inspection in Sweden. The section thereafter holds 
a description of how data was collected and analysed followed by the presentation and  
discussion of the results before the paper ends with some concluding remarks. The study is on 
multi-dwelling housing within the cooperative housing sector in Sweden and for the purpose 
of this study, building quality is delineated by the defects reported by the owners who are 
represented by the cooperative’s governing board members.
Building quality, trust and customer satisfaction
The literature offers different approaches to defining quality, from subjective judgement 
(Holt and Rowe, 2000; Mohr-Jackson, 1998) to specific and more objective measurements 
such as a customer’s satisfaction with a product’s performance (Barrett, 2000), or compliance 
with the set of requirements and goals specified by the client, agreed with and achieved by 
the contractor (Chan and Tam, 2000; Crosby, 1984; Lützkendorf and Speer, 2005). Milion, 
Alves and Paliari (2017) investigated the relationship between reported defects and customer 
satisfaction, and concluded that the occurrence of defects only partially affects customers’ 
satisfaction and that to a large extent customer dissatisfaction can be linked to developers’ 
post-occupancy service and repair process after a claim was reported. 
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Hopkin, et al. (2017) found a significant difference in how the house owner, the house 
builder and the building inspector perceive the levels of importance of defects encountered 
in the buildings. Homeowners prioritised as important the effect that defects had on 
functionality and the great inconvenience caused in the owners’ daily life. The major concern 
for the builders and the inspectors was for the costs related to a complaint. All the actors 
took into consideration the disruptive consequences of defects but the approach towards 
ranking those defects was different, which has an impact on the house buyer’s satisfaction and 
perception of quality.
Sommerville (2007) argued that the residential sector of the construction industry 
has two types of customers. The first category consists of the professional customers, 
the procurers involved in commercial projects, who are knowledgeable and able to set 
requirements to be complied with. The second group are the private customers, the end-
users, private new house buyers who possess a multitude of perceptions and differing 
expectations of the finished product. These buyers are rarely involved in setting the 
specifications used during quality control as these are often given by the developer.  
Consequently, validation of building quality by the end-user, defined in Crosby (1984) as 
the accepted level of compliance to a customer’s requirements, is rarely applicable in this 
case. The end-users are often inexperienced or lacking technical knowledge and missing 
the vocabulary and phrases as well as expressions needed to communicate with industry 
professionals. The absence of a standard lexicon widens the gap between the customer and 
the developer and can further affect customer satisfaction (Sommerville, 2007). Forcada, 
et al. (2016) found that even in cases where the same terminology was used when describing 
the nature of defects during the construction, handover and post-handover stages, the types 
of defects differ. Disputes can even arise between industry professionals, who do not always 
place the defects in the same classification (Georgiou, 2010). A comparable problem occurs 
even at the design stage when architects and the clients use similar words to describe greatly 
differing aspirations as noted in Cole-Colander (2003).
Studies such as Georgiou, Love and Smith (1999) showed that during post-handover 
inspection housing owners are more likely to identify defects related to functional quality, 
aesthetics, cleanness and final presentation. The observable defects are usually related to the 
omission errors caused by subcontractors’ tight schedule, mishaps in processes or low quality 
of workmanship, as most design defects are detected and solved in the construction stage 
or handover. If the design defects remain, they are not visible until the operation phase. 
Auchterlounie (2009) noted that private house owners might be aware of technical defects 
which they do not prioritise in their reporting because they believe and trust that professionals 
have supervised as well as inspected the technical aspects. The study finds the perception 
of building quality to be an outcome of the interaction and communication between the 
developer/builder, the owner/end-user and the inspector. 
This study complements earlier ones such as Forcada, Macarulla and Love (2012) that 
analysed whether a significant difference existed in the quality of the two main residential 
building types, flats and detached houses, as well as Rotimi, Tookey and Rotimi (2015) that 
evaluated defect reporting. The study explores whether a significant difference exists in the 
owners’ perception of the building quality, when considering  their perception of the inspector 
and the inspection process in a housing sector. A majority of the tenant-owner cooperatives 
(TOCs) are initiated by a developer, often a building firm that later populates the development 
through advertising and sales campaigns. Representatives of the developer sit on the initial 
governing board in such TOCs. A Swedish government inquiry (Boverket, 2018) notes that 
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the number of developers in the market has exploded since 2000 from a handful to several 
hundred  with a correspondingly high  level of reported construction faults and defects, raising 
concerns about principal-agent problems such as hidden incentives and the consequences for 
the less knowledgeable owner-buyers. This background forms the basis for choosing to apply a 
principal-agent perspective to the study presented in this paper. 
Principal – agent perspective
It is rational, according to agency theory, to assume that the interests of the agent will differ 
from those of the principal and that the agent will choose the actions that maximise his or 
her utility ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The heterogeneous nature of real estate produces 
situations in which the person or entity offering a service or product (the agent), for example 
a developer or broker, knows more about the property than the person requiring the same (the 
principal), for example, a home buyer. From a principal-agent perspective, the developer of 
multi-family cooperative housing is interested in selling all of the flats produced and with as 
little post-occupancy rework as possible. Thus, it could be assumed that some developers might 
utilise the exisiting information assymetry in engaging inspectors that are inclined to the 
developer and not neutral in their interaction with the owner during the inspection or in other 
ways exploit the lack of understanding of the process. Principal-agent relations come with 
costs related to monitoring the performance of the agent to ensure that it is in line with the 
principal’s interests. But, as noted in Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997), if the principal 
has trust in the agent then there will be less need for monitoring and subsequently the agency 
costs will be mitigated. 
According to Rodgers (2010), trust in a building inspector or any other agent will take 
one of three pathways: rational-based, rule-based, or category-based, where trust as a rational 
decision will occur in a situation when there is complete understanding of the other party’s 
incentives and goals, even when there is no information to use for a qualified judgement. This 
is more likely to take place between a knowledgeable principal and an expert agent such as 
is the case with professional procurers/developers and the inspectors. In immature markets, 
where the information available is unreliable or irrelevant, participants will disregard it and 
base their judgement on strictly forcible normative rules or the legal system to predict possible 
outcomes of relationships. The decision to trust, distrust or not trust follows thereafter and an 
already trustworthy relationship will become stronger in a setting with enforceable standards. 
Category-based trust arises in a situation when preformatted information is a basis that 
influences the decision to trust. This is common, for example, when dealing with agents who 
are members of a trade cooperation network rooted in the use of shared information, such 
as chartered certification agencies like RICS which is well recognised and thus provides the 
pedestal for the trust (Rodgers, 2010). 
PRINCIPAL-AGENCY RELATIONS DURING BUILDING INSPECTION WITHIN THE TOC 
HOUSING SECTOR
The major building inspections during construction are the statutory control (Figure 1A), the 
final pre-handover inspection (Figure 1B) and a post-handover guarantee inspection (Figure 
1C) that takes place before the expiry of the shortest guarantee period. 
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Figure 1 Relationships during building inspection (source: Authors)
This study focuses on the guarantee inspection which is defined as “building inspection 
with the aim of investigating to what extent errors in a contract occurred during the warranty 
period applicable to the contract” (Boverket, 2007, s.43). The guarantee period is usually 
shorter for materials and appliances than for workmanship and the contractor is liable even 
longer for some defects. Building inspection as defined in Rotimi, Tookey and Rotimi (2015) 
refers to pre-handover defect reporting depicted in Figure 1B.
In this study “inspection process” refers to the performance of the two-year (or five year) 
post-handover guarantee inspection in an activity that resembles the quadripartite connections 
depicted in figure 1C. In Sweden this process is quite formalised and has checklists but is 
based on industrial agreements not laws, with the inspector contracted by the developer. The 
process aims at noting defects that have arisen during the post-handover period and which 
the contractor is liable to rectify. Crucial at this stage is to determine whether the complaint 
is justified on non-contractual grounds or has a completely different cause. Furthermore, 
parts that have been approved during the final inspection (figure 1B) cannot be noted by the 
inspectors as errors during the warranty inspection. The contractor does not need to remedy 
any errors that an inspector has missed during the final inspection. The inspector is expected 
to act professionally and in a manner that takes into consideration the owners’ views. In some 
cases, the contractor is a subsidiary to the developer who engages the inspector. Furthermore, 
in newly constructed estates the developer will have representatives on the board of the TOC 
(the owner) for up to two or three years. Though the TOCs (the owners) are free to engage an 
expert to assist during the inspection, not all do so. 
The focus of this paper is primarily on the relationship between the inspector and the less-
knowledgeable owner and how this relates to the owner’s perception of the building quality. 
Based on the view in Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) that trust affects satistaction, 
the contribution of this study is that it highlights the importance of taking into account the 
possible hidden incentives in the interaction “a” in figure 1C as a compliment to decisions 
based on other measures of building quality.
Method
DATA COLLECTION
The results presented in this paper are based on data that was collected through a questionnaire 
sent to the chairpersons of governing boards in all of the 1563 TOCs with estates built 
between 2008 and 2013. The range was determined based on available information as well as 
a wish to include estates that had experienced at least one post-handover guarantee inspection 
(2013) or the five-year guarantee inspection. However, a number of responses indicated 
building production beyond the aimed building construction period. This might be due to the 
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fact that buildings were constructed in phases and consequently may have different handing-
over dates. Considering the aim of the paper, the authors believed that it was reasonable to 
include responses stating building production year prior to 2008 but excluding buildings with 
occupation date after 2013. Furthermore, the study focused on housing that could be accessible 
without conditions and therefore TOCs owning special category estates labelled as senior, 
leisure and student housing were not included. This left a total of 394 completed forms from 
TOCs relevant to the study. 
The survey, which consisted of 31 closed-end questions, requested among other things that 
participants rate their perception of the inspector’s competence, fairness and independence 
from the developer, and the TOCs’ degree of involvement in and comprehension of the 
inspection process. The respondents were also asked to indicate the perceived occurrence 
of defects according to the following scale: no defect appeared (1), defect appeared but 
was considered as a minor problem (2) or defect appeared and was considered as a severe 
problem (3). The total number of defects reported by each respondent was computed as the 
row average of the defects from the TOC’s buildings in the survey. The defects included the 
building envelope/air tightness, drainage and plumbing, installations (HVAC), the finish, as 
well as appliances (Zalejska-Jonsson and Gunnelin, 2019). A quality index was created as a 
row average of all reported problems in the owned building(s). In the index, values closer to 
“1” suggest that there are no, or just a few, minor problems in the building(s) while the index’s 
maximal value, “3”, alludes to serious problems in the building as experienced by the owners. 
DATA ANALYSIS
The study was based on the hypothesis that the TOCs perception of the inspector is correlated 
to the perception of building quality measured by the described quality index. Additionally, 
the authors tested whether the perception of the inspector and the inspection process varied 
depending on: the construction year as indicated by respondents in the survey, the TOC’s 
geographical location in proximity to large cities, the size of the TOC measured in number 
of dwellings, the company size of the developer and that of the contractor (measured in the 
registered number of employees).
The null hypothesis of the equality of the means of the quality index in the subgroups was 
tested using the following: 
H1. The mean of reported defects is equal regardless of the perception of an inspector
H2. The mean of the reported defects is equal regardless of the perception of the 
inspection process
In order to determine the probability of significant difference among three or more groups 
as a unit analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used for parametric data or Kruskal-Wallis test for 
non-parametric data (Baumgardner, 1997). However, as the results do not tell which group 
(if any) is different, post-hoc tests are needed in order to find out which of the significantly 
different pair(s) of groups in the tests are different. When a Kruskal–Wallis test is rejected 
Dunn’s test, modified by for example the Benjamini-Hochberg comparison method, is the 
appropriate nonparametric pairwise multiple-comparison procedure (Dinno, 2015). 
In order to test the hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA test was performed with the quality 
index as the dependent variable. The variable fulfils the normal distribution and independence 
assumption. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test the difference in respondents’ opinion in relation to 
geographical location, size of TOC (measured in number of dwellings) and size of developer 
as well as contractor (measured in number of employees). This non-parametrical test was 
used due to the categorical nature of data on which a post-hoc Dunn’s test, the Benjamini-
Hochberg comparison method was applied where relevant. The analysis was conducted using 
statistical package STATA 14. 
Results
RESPONDENTS
Eighty-seven percent of those who responded represented TOCs located in large urban areas. 
The majority of the TOCs (64%) owned estates consisting of between 16 and 60 dwellings, 
which is consistent with the norm in Sweden. The computed alpha lambda to test the 
reliability of the survey answers based on 12 items in the survey was 0.84 and considered as 
satisfactory. The mean value for the computed quality index was 1.65 with a standard deviation 
of 0.348. 
PERCEPTION OF THE INSPECTOR
The results shown in Table 1 indicated that sixty-eight percent of the respondents fully 
agreed with the statement that the inspector was fair, and that the inspector was perceived 
as competent. A clear majority also believed that the inspector had acted independently of 
the developer during the execution of the work and about the same number perceived the 
inspector as careful. 
Table 1 Perception of the inspector.
Perception of the inspector Disagree Partly agree Fully agree
The inspector was competent 5% 16 % 79 %
The inspector was fair 10 % 22 % 68 %
The inspector was autonomous 15 % 27 % 58 %
The inspector was careful 11 % 30 % 59 %
The inspector missed crucial defects 25 % 47 % 28 %
Morgan and Hunt (1994) found qualities such as being consistent, competent, honest, 
fair, responsible, helpful and benevolent to be symbols of trust. The results above provided an 
indication that there was trust for the inspector. This was followed by a Kruskal-Wallis test to 
analyse how the inspector was perceived by various subgroups and if the difference between 
the groups is so large that it cannot be taken to have occurred by chance. The result was found 
to be significant only for perception of inspector fairness when the respondents were grouped 
according to the category construction year (p=0.0058, Table 2). A post-hoc Dunn’s test was 
thus carried out on construction year. This indicated that the difference is significant only 
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between responses received from TOCs with buildings constructed in 2006 in comparison 
to other buildings. Multiple pairwise comparison showed that the ranked value for responses 
from buildings constructed in 2006 was lower than that from other buildings, suggesting that 
TOCs in those buildings perceived the inspector to be less fair. However, the limitation of data 
restricted further analysis of this result.
Table 2 Perception of the inspector, p-values, Kruskal-Wallis test with tiles.
Perception of the 
inspector
The inspector 
was 
competent
The 
inspector 
was fair
The inspector 
was 
autonomous
The 
inspector 
was rigorous
Construction year 0.1076 0.0058 0.3619 0.3103
TOC size (number 
of dwellings)
0.5869 0.4269 0.8888 0.6255
Geographical 
location
0.4194 0.4023 0.3467 0.8662
Developer size 0.1758 0.2011 0.0359 0.6242
Contractor size 0.2119 0.7959 0.2097 0.8558
By virtue of size it could be expected that large developers commission more inspections 
and it could be assumed that this might have an effect on long-term relationships with 
inspectors active in the particular market, leading owners to have some doubt about 
independent behaviour. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test (p=0.0359, Table 2) indicated 
that only the developer’s company size had a statistically significant effect on the perception 
of the inspector’s assessment as autonomous. However, the post hoc Dunn test using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg comparison method showed no statistically significant difference for 
comparison between the different groups based on developer size. Though the result for the 
large developers appeared to be consistent with the assumption based on general beliefs, 
there is a need for more research related to the mistrust in inspectors commissioned by the 
smallest developers since any perceived lack of autonomy has an effect on the perceived level of 
trustworthiness as defined by Goeschl and Jarke (2017).
PERCEPTION OF THE INSPECTION PROCESS
According to 90% of the respondents, the TOCs had been involved in the inspection process. 
However, one in five of the TOCs had perceived the inspection process as complicated and 
difficult to follow. Forty-six percent of all the TOCs in the survey (Table 3) did not have 
external support during the inspection but relied only on the competence of members on 
the TOC’s governing board. A majority of the participants in the survey (76%, Table 3) had 
followed a checklist. Though the inspector is compelled to register notations made by the 
participating parties only 32% of the respondents reported that the remarks voiced by the 
TOC had been noted and just about every fourth TOC (26%) indicated high satisfaction with 
the inspection process. 
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Table 3 Perception of the inspection process.
Perception of the inspection process Disagree Partly 
agree
Fully 
agree
mean 
value
the inspection process was 
complicated 
37 % 41 % 22 % 1.85
we were involved in the inspection 
process
10 % 33 % 57 % 2.46
the inspection process was 
standardised and not applicable to our 
property
48 % 37 % 15 % 1.67
we have followed a checklist 24 % 36 % 40 % 2.15
we had external support of an expert 46 % 19 % 35 % 1.88
all our comments were noted 21 % 47 % 32 % 2.10
we are in general satisfied with the 
inspection process
31 % 43 % 26 % 1.94
A more detailed analysis of the results revealed that uncertainty as to the inspection process 
as well as the inspector’s disregard of the TOC’s comments had a significant effect on general 
satisfaction with the process. The use of checklists, notation of remarks and other routines expected 
by the participating TOCs strengthen the degree of rule-based trust in the process and the inspector. 
Table 4 shows results of how the inspection process was perceived based on various 
categories of respondents. The analysis of the respondents’ answers based on the construction 
year revealed that there was a statistically significant difference in how the inspection process 
was perceived, especially in terms of the suitability of the process and ease as well as on how 
well the inspector noted the comments given. However, the interpretation of the results is 
intricate. The guarantee inspections generally take place two and five years after occupancy, 
whereby the older TOCs may have a better understanding of the inspection process. 
Table 4 Perception of the inspection process, p-values Kruskal-Wallis test with tiles.
Kruskal-
Wallis test 
with   tiles 
the 
inspection 
process was 
complicated
we were 
involved 
in the 
inspection 
process
inspection 
process was 
standardised 
and not 
applicable to 
our property
we have 
followed 
a 
checklist
we had 
external 
support of 
an expert
all our 
comments 
have been 
noted
we are in 
general 
satisfied 
with the 
inspection 
process
Construction 
year
0.0284 0.3541 0.0093 0.1010 0.5602 0.0093 0.1022
TOC size 
(number of 
dwellings)
0.1159 0.7863 0.0665 0.4312 0.9595 0.8271 0.8332
Geographical 
location
0.3777 0.0475 0.7563 0.2300 0.6287 0.2507 0.0869
Developer 
size
0.1232 0.5553 0.7276 0.9898 0.9579 0.8777 0.0668
Contractor 
size
0.9120 0.8115 0.4491 0.5389 0.4912 0.6750 0.8799
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The pairwise comparison test showed a statistically significant difference between the 
perception of the inspection process as complicated by TOCs built in 2006 in comparison to 
those constructed in and after 2011. Likewise, there was a statistically significant difference 
in the perception of the process as standardised for TOCs built in 2012 compared with those 
constructed in 2007 and in 2011. 
TRUST AND THE PERCEPTION OF BUILDING QUALITY (HYPOTHESIS H1)
The results presented in Table 5 computed with the ANOVA test, p<0.000) indicated that 
the null hypothesis of equality of mean of the quality index for trust of the inspector based 
on perception of the inspector’s competence, fairness, as well independence and rigorous 
assessment (H1) could be rejected. 
Table 5 Perception of building quality (mean values), in relation to impression of an 
inspector. 
Hypothesis H1 ANOVA 
r-squared
p N quality index mean values per 
group
 disagree  partly 
agree
 
agree
The inspector was 
competent
0.0593 0.00 338 1.74 1.82 1.60
The inspector was 
fair  
0.0661 0.00 327 1.82 1.75 1.58
The inspector was 
autonomous
0.0572 0.00 326 1.79 1.72 1.57
The inspector was 
rigorous
0.0853 0.00 344 1.92 1.67 1.58
The results presented in table 5 are based on  a scale of 1 to 3 with increasing severity as 
presented under the section on data collection. The conclusion to reject the null hypothesis was 
based on the fact that fewer severe defects were reported by the TOCs when the respondents 
perceived the inspector as competent and fair (mean values 1.60 and 1.58, respectively). On 
the other hand, the mean for reported defects was 1.74 when the inspector was perceived as 
lacking competence and 1.82 when the inspector was deemed as unfair (table 5). Findings 
suggested that the representatives of a TOC were less likely to report that the problems 
experienced in the buildings were severe when the respondents had trust and confidence in the 
inspector. 
PERCEPTION OF BUILDING QUALITY IN RELATIONSHIP TO INSPECTION PROCESS 
(HYPOTHESIS H2)
Results in Table 6, which are also based on the same scale as those in table 5, indicated that 
the null hypothesis that the mean of the quality index is equal regardless of the perception of 
the inspection process could be rejected. The results showed that a better understanding of, 
and involvement in, the process as well as detailed notation of remarks during the inspection 
process were statistically significant factors that correlated to the perception of building 
quality. Furthermore, analysis showed that there were differences within the subgroups. TOCs 
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in which owners felt involved in the inspection process and believed that their comments had 
been noted indicated fewer severe defects (mean value 1.58 and 1.53, respectively, Table 6) 
than the owners who felt excluded from the process and believed that their comments had 
been ignored (mean value 1.74 and 1.78, respectively, Table 6). The mean value of the quality 
index in TOCs where the survey participant perceived the inspection process as complicated 
was higher (1.80) than for TOCs whose respondents considered the inspection process as easy 
to follow (mean value 1.52, Table 6). Likewise, the TOCs in which the inspection process was 
perceived as standardised and not applicable to the property also reported a larger degree of 
defects with severe consequences. 
Table 6 Perception of building quality (mean values), in relation to the inspection 
process. 
 Hypothesis (H2) ANOVA 
r-squared
p N quality index mean 
values per group
Dis-
agree
partly 
agree
agree
the inspection process was 
complicated
0.1002 0.000 324 1.52 1.67 1.80
we were involved in the 
inspection process
0.0347 0.000 354 1.74 1.71 1.58
inspection process was 
standardised and not 
applicable to our property
0.0216 0.012 318 1.59 1.68 1.73
we have followed a 
checklist
0.0107 0.070 312
we had external support of 
an expert 
0.0033 0.643 344
all our comments have 
been noted
0.0636 0.000 345 1.78 1.65 1.53
we are in general satisfied 
with the inspection 
process
0.0927 0.000 356 1.78 1.62 1.51
Thus, according to the survey results, how the inspection process was perceived by the 
owner also appears to have had a correlation to their perception of building quality.
Concluding comments
The relationship between trust in the inspector and the number of defects reported has been 
explored in  previous studies. However, there is restricted literature on the principal-agency 
aspect of utility losses due to adverse selection and moral hazard in housing sectors, in which 
consequences of untrustworthiness towards the less-knowledgeable owner-buyer might 
become evident long after post-handover inspections. 
Results from the study indicate that nearly a half of the TOCs relied on their own 
competence during the inspection and were dubious about the inspection process. Thus, in a 
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situation where building quality is based on the confidence towards inspector’s accuracy and 
fairness, and the owners’ blind assumption that the inspector notes and reports technical faults, 
it is apparent that developers who are mostly interested in short term profit may benefit from 
the presented principle-agent dilemma.
The number of developers active in the residential sector in Sweden has exploded at the 
same time as numbers in other sectors have remained close to constant. There is reason to 
believe that an inspector might be tempted not to disclose certain quality issues for the benefit 
of the developer. If TOCs are not able to actively participate in the inspection process because 
they cannot grasp perplexity of the process or adequately communicate their concerns, the risk 
for defects left unseen and not reported increases. In many cases, it takes a number of years for 
symptoms of defects to be visible and noticed by occupants. With time, the complexity of the 
problems and cost of rectification increases substantially. 
Deteriorating building quality has negative consequences from economic, environmental 
and social perspectives. Building quality has effects on energy performance, which raises 
operational costs; additionally, need for acute reparations intensifies and maintenance costs 
will increase. Furthermore, it is rational to postulate that repercussion of hidden defects in the 
buildings leads towards “lemon market” (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, there is a need to advance 
efforts to raise the knowledge level and how it is passed on to new governing board members 
in the TOCs.
A major implication of the study is that efforts to address shortcomings related to the 
gap between the developer and the owner, in the context of building quality and perceived 
severity of defects, are not location specific, but need to be customised to different owner 
groups. A better understanding of the inspection process by the owner correlates to the 
effective participation and leads to an improved building quality. This adds to the list of factors 
previously discussed in the research community, for example, a lack of common terminology 
(Sommerville, 2007; Forcada, et al., 2013) and perception of rectification costs (Milion, Alves 
and Paliari, 2017). 
There are incentives with a positive outcome for developers as well as owners to invest in 
efforts geared towards increasing the trust in, and understanding of, the guarantee inspection 
by the sizeable group of largely uninformed homebuyers within the single and/or multi-
dwelling housing sectors through different pathways as described in Rodgers (2010). The 
study’s conclusion is that a better understanding of the inspection process by owners would 
improve participation and raise the value of carrying out the process. 
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